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In The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration
Law, Professor Kerry Abrams tells a story that illustrates what she
terms the "productive" role of immigration law.1 We typically
conceptualize immigration law as regulation that restricts entry into a
territory. Abrams, by contrast, examines how the law induces the
development of a certain type of population by encouraging settlement
and family formation by citizens considered desirable. These
productive effects occur in part through legal mechanisms that we do
not usually associate with immigration law, such as marriage and
property law. Here, Abrams draws upon her innovative earlier work
on the connections between immigration law and marriage2 to show
Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. I am grateful to Kerry
Abrams and Courtney Joslin for their helpful suggestions and insights.
1. Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1401 (2009).
2. See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 641 (2005).
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that marriage law, by legitimizing and promoting a sought-after
population, itself functions as a kind of immigration law.
Abrams's account entails an expansive definition of
immigration law-one that encompasses not only international
migration, but also interstate migration. The story of the Mercer Girls
illustrates how the law encouraged a group perceived of as white
"brides" to journey from Massachusetts to frontier Washington State
in order to promote the growth of a white population. Abrams shows
that this was achieved in part through an absence of legal restrictions,
which enabled the westward migration of young, marriageable white
women. 3 At the same time, marriage and property laws were designed
to promote the formation and prospering of white families to the
exclusion of others,4 in particular an interracial population that was
beginning to take hold.
This Response elaborates upon how Abrams's work is helpful in
thinking about one of the most controversial contemporary examples
of the legal shaping of a population: the current battle across the
states over the formation, recognition, and protection of gay and
lesbian families. Abrams's characterization of state-to-state migration
as a form of immigration law, together with her notion of the
productive dimension of immigration law, provides a useful
framework for conceptualizing contemporary approaches to same-sex
marriage and the regulation and recognition of gay and lesbian
parents.
From the perspective of this framework, we can understand the
current patchwork of state approaches to gay and lesbian families as a
form of interstate immigration law that facilitates a further
polarization of the United States into what Naomi Cahn and June
Carbone have recently characterized as "blue families" and "red
families."5 Cahn and Carbone describe the United States as having
become, in recent decades, divided into two groups of states with
sharply opposing attitudes toward family life and family law. In their
map of the nation, the coasts are lined with "blue family" states that
favor a legal regime offering equality and sexual freedom of choice,
while the middle of the country is filled with "red family" states that
"continueH to celebrate the unity of sex, marriage, and procreation."6
One vector of polarization that Cahn and Carbone map out is the
3. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 1381-1401.
4. See id. at 1401-14.
5. NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION
AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE (2010).
6. Id. at 2.
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approach to same-sex marriage7 and custody of children by gay and
lesbian parents.8
When applied to the family-law polarization Cahn and Carbone
discuss, Abrams's expansive definition of immigration law can be used
to tell a new story of twenty-first-century immigration regulation.
Abrams notes that most historians characterize the population of the
American West as "settlement history" and thus obscure the ways in
which this story is also one of immigration. According to Abrams, we
should recall that the development of a white population in the
Western Territories helped to make the West "an American property"
and to create the current geographic map of the United States.9
Similarly, we can think of today's cultural and political landscape-in
which the coasts and the central states are sharply divided in both
their practices of family formation and their normative stances on
family forms-as the product of family- and property-law regimes that
constitute, in Abrams's vocabulary, a form of immigration law.
In particular, there are three legal regimes that work to
encourage patterns of interstate migration that may increase the
current polarization of family forms in the United States: regulation of
same-sex marriage, regulation of assisted reproductive technology,
and the law of employee benefits.
I. GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILY REGULATION AS IMMIGRATION LAW
The current patchwork of state and federal law regulating
same-sex marriage functions, from the perspective of Abrams's model,
as a form of interstate immigration law. This regulation has three
significant dimensions: the extension of, or refusal to extend, marriage
rights to same-sex couples; the refusal by many states, and by the
federal government, to recognize same-sex marriages formed in other
jurisdictions; and the refusal of many states to dissolve same-sex
marriages formalized in other jurisdictions by granting a divorce.
Currently, seven jurisdictions 0 will issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples and recognize same-sex marriages formed
7. Id. at 131-37.
8. Id. at 141-50.
9. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1356.
10. This count includes neither Washington nor Maryland. Washington's governor signed a
law legalizing gay marriage on February 13, 2012. The law does not go into effect until June
2012. Nicole Neroulias, Washington State's Governor Signs Gay Marriage Law, REUTERS, Feb.
13, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-gaymarriage-washington-
idUSTRE81C15L20120213. Maryland s governor signed a law legalizing gay marriage on March
1, 2012. The law does not go into effect until January 2013. Ian Duncan, Maryland Governor
Signs Same-Sex Marriage Law, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2012,
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elsewhere: Massachusetts," Connecticut, 12 owa, 13 Vermont,14 New
Hampshire, 15 the District of Columbia, 16 and New York.17 In four
states-Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, and Vermont-the initial
movement toward same-sex marriage was judicial rather than
legislative. The supreme court of each of these states found that
withholding from same-sex couples the right to marry, or the rights
and benefits of marriage,18 violated the equivalent of the federal Due
Process or Equal Protection Clause in the state constitution. 19
The role of marriage in promoting child-rearing and protecting
children was central to the case law striking down the ban on same-
sex marriage in each of these states. As the Massachusetts Supreme
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/O 1/news/la-pn-maryland-gay-marriage-law-signed-
20120301.
11. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the rights and benefits of civil marriage violates the state
constitution).
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-20(4) (2011).
13. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 872, 906 (Iowa 2009) (holding that the exclusion of same-
sex couples from civil marriage violates the state constitution).
14. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2011).
15. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2011).
16. D.C. CODE § 46-401(a) (2011).
17. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 10-a(1) (Consol. 2011).
18. In both Vermont and Massachusetts, the court's holding concerned the denial to same-
sex couples of the rights and benefits of marriage, rather than of the status of marriage. See
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) ("We declare that barring
an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that
person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution."); Baker
v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) ("While some future case may attempt to establish
that-notwithstanding equal benefits and protections under Vermont law-the denial of a
marriage license operates per se to deny constitutionally-protected rights, that is not the claim
we address today. We hold only that plaintiffs are entitled . . . to obtain the same benefits and
protections afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples."). The Massachusetts court
subsequently held, in an advisory opinion, that providing same-sex couples the right to enter into
civil unions, rather than to marry, would not suffice to remedy the constitutional violation. See
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004). The Vermont
legislature initially provided same-sex couples with the right to enter into civil unions with
rights and benefits equivalent to those of marriage, but, in 2009, extended to same-sex couples
the right to marry. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2011) (defining marriage as the "legally
recognized union of two people").
19. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411-12 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 872, 906 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948; Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
The California Supreme Court reached the same conclusion, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,
401 (Cal. 2008), only to be overturned through a popular referendum amending the state
constitution to define marriage as between a man and a woman. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. That
state constitutional amendment, in turn, was subsequently found to violate the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the federal Constitution in a case still wending its way through the
federal courts. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 995, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court on the basis of Equal Protection. Perry v. Brown, No. 10-
16696, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2328, at *115-16 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012).
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Judicial Court observed in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
enabling parents to marry makes a significant difference in the
protections afforded their children.20 The children of married couples
are
the recipients of special legal and economic protections obtained by civil marriage.
Notwithstanding the Commonwealth's strong public policy to abolish legal distinctions
between marital and nonmarital children in providing for the support and care of
minors, the fact remains that marital children reap a measure of family stability and
economic security based on their parents' legally privileged status that is largely
inaccessible, or not as readily accessible, to nonmarital children. Some of these benefits
are social, such as the enhanced approval that still attends the status of being a marital
child. Others are material, such as the greater ease of access to family-based State and
Federal benefits that attend the presumptions of one's parentage. 2 1
Just as antimiscegenation laws were designed to refuse
recognition and legal benefits to the offspring of interracial
marriages-thus promoting the development and economic success of
a desired white population 22-bans on same-sex marriage, as the court
in Goodridge recognized, disadvantage not only gay and lesbian
couples, but also their children.23 Like the antimiscegenation laws of
earlier times, such bans create a class of children and their parents
unable to avail themselves of either the legal protections of marriage
or the corresponding legal, economic, and social benefits available to
heterosexual families. The California Supreme Court aptly
characterized this ban as creating a type of "second-class citizenship"24
that encompasses the children of same-sex parents as well as the
parents themselves. Because the ban on same-sex marriage affects
children as well as adults, the result is to discourage the development
of certain populations, namely, those who are raised in households
headed by same-sex couples.
One must keep these points in mind to fully understand the
importance of the decision by a majority of states and the federal
government to ban recognition of same-sex marriage. After Hawaii's
highest court suggested that same-sex marriage might be
20. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962-64.
21. Id. at 957 (citations omitted).
22. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 1412.
23. Even in the absence of marriage, there are a number of legal protections available to
same-sex couples and their children. In approximately half the states, for instance, children born
to same-sex couples can establish legally recognized parent-child relationships with both parents
through second-parent adoptions. See Courtney G. Joslin, The Legal Parentage of Children Born
to Same-Sex Couples: Developments in the Law, 39 FAM. L.Q. 683, 691-93 (2005) (discussing
second-parent adoption laws and their limitations).
24. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 452.
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constitutionally required under Hawaii's Equal Protection Clause, 25
many expressed concern that gay and lesbian couples might travel to
Hawaii, acquire a marriage license, and require their state to confer
the benefits that marriage affords. 26 These concerns resulted in
enactment of the federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") in 1996.
The law limits federal recognition of marriages to those between a
man and a woman 27 and permits states to refuse to recognize same-
sex marriages performed in other states. 28 Alongside the federal
DOMA, forty-two states currently enforce "mini-DOMAs," statutory
and constitutional prohibitions on performing or recognizing same-sex
marriages.29
The result of this current state of the law is that same-sex
couples who are able to marry will find it difficult to move to other
states with their marital status intact. A further limitation on the
mobility of married same-sex couples is the prevalence of jurisdictions
that refuse to dissolve same-sex unions by granting a divorce. 30 States
with a mini-DOMA will typically refuse to recognize a same-sex
marriage formalized elsewhere, even for the purpose of dissolving the
marriage. 31 Even states without a mini-DOMA may refuse to
recognize a same-sex marriage, and to issue a divorce, if the state does
not perform such marriages.32 Same-sex spouses who relocate to a
state that refuses to recognize their marriage may be effectively
25. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63-67 (Haw. 1993) (finding that Hawaii's limitation of
marriage to a man and a woman created a sex-based classification, and as such was subject to
strict scrutiny under article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution).
26. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 1-18 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2905-
22 (discussing the implications of Baehr).
27. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
29. See Elisabeth Oppenheimer, No Exit: The Problem of Same-Sex Divorce, 90 N.C. L. REV.
73, 84 n.44 (2011) (listing state constitutional and statutory mini-DOMAs).
30. Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum
Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1671 (2011) ("Thousands of same-sex couples . . . are in
marriages considered valid in some jurisdictions in the U.S. but, as a practical matter, are
unable to obtain a divorce."); Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 76 ("[S]ome gay couples find
themselves in the unique situation of being married without any way to divorce.").
31. See Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C.5th 558, 575-76 (Berks Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. 2010)
(finding that Pennsylvania's statutory ban on recognizing same-sex marriage precluded state
courts from granting a divorce and upholding the ban as constitutional). A number of mini-
DOMA jurisdictions have also enacted legislation refusing to recognize civil unions, domestic
partnerships, or even private contracts "purporting to bestow the privileges or obligations of
marriage" on same-sex couples. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2012).
32. See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 967 (R.I. 2007) (finding that Rhode Island
Family Court was without jurisdiction to entertain a divorce proceeding involving a same-sex
couple married in Massachusetts). But see Martinez v. Cnty. of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743
(App. Div. 2008) (recognizing same-sex marriage celebrated in Canada, even though New York
did not at the time issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples).
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unable to obtain a divorce, because they may fail to fulfill the domicile
or residency requirements for divorce in the state that married them. 33
State mini-DOMAs, working in tandem with the federal
DOMA, constitute a form of what Abrams terms immigration law-
they encourage the development of a desired population while
discouraging the development and flourishing of an unwanted
population. Like the nineteenth-century bans on interracial marriage
in the Western Territories, these statutes and state constitutional
amendments may dissuade migration from other states by families
deemed undesirable, in this case, same-sex couples and their
offspring. By withholding the privileges of marriage, family law
severely curtails the mobility of same-sex couples. If not dissuaded
from moving by legal regimes that refuse to recognize their
relationships, same-sex couples who are already married may well
find themselves disadvantaged and burdened as a result of their
moves, often-as in the case of inability to divorce-in unanticipated
ways.
II. ASSISTED-REPRODUCTIVE-TECHNOLOGY REGULATION AS
IMMIGRATION LAW
Gay and lesbian parents often employ assisted reproductive
technology ("ART"), including surrogacy, egg donation, and sperm
donation, to create their families. The turn of gay and lesbian parents
toward ART makes them vulnerable where states wish to discourage
gays and lesbians from population development. Through the
regulation of ART and the parental rights of children born through
ART, states unfavorable to gay and lesbian parents can both
undermine the security and stability of their families and dissuade
them from having children in the first instance.
First, states can place obstacles in the way of gay and lesbian
family formation through the legal regulation of custody rights. By
refusing to recognize the status of the nonbiological parent of a gay or
lesbian couple, states can inflict uncertainty and instability on the
families of these couples. 34 Other ways in which states can, and do,
33. See Kern, 11 Pa. D. & C.5th at 560 n.2, 563 (refusing to grant divorce to same-sex couple
residing in Pennsylvania on the basis that Pennsylvania law precluded recognition of their
marriage, while noting that the couple did not meet the residency requirements necessary to
obtain a divorce in the state in which they married).
34. See Courtney G. Joslin, Travel Insurance: Protecting Lesbian and Gay Parent Families
Across State Lines, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 31, 31 (2010) ("Over the years, the law's failure to
recognize the legal status of one of the child s two intended parents has left tens if not hundreds
of thousands of children emotionally and financially vulnerable.").
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discourage family formation by gay and lesbian parents include
denying custody and visitation rights on the basis of sexual
orientation;35 refusing to allow gay and lesbian couples to adopt;36 and
denying second-parent adoptions, 37 which are currently the most
reliable mechanism for gay and lesbian parents to protect their ties to
their nonbiological children, as they require recognition by all states
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 38
More powerful still, in some ways, is the ability of states to
either facilitate or prevent procreation by regulating the forms of ART
that gays and lesbians often employ. Lesbian women who desire a
child with a genetic link must employ, at a minimum, a sperm donor,
either anonymous or known, in order to procreate. Gay men with the
same goal require an egg donor and also require a surrogate-either
the donor herself or a gestational carrier-to carry the pregnancy. The
regulation of ART and surrogacy is especially effective at shaping
population development, because such regulation can either encourage
or dissuade gays and lesbians-either individually or as couples-from
procreating in the first instance. The current patchwork of approaches
to ART has combined with private market forces to create a polarized
regime in which some states are especially open to procreation by gay
and lesbian parents. This situation may encourage interstate
migration of gay and lesbian individuals or couples to more favorable
jurisdictions and spur family formation by those already residing in
such jurisdictions. 39
California, for instance, has developed a line of parentage case
law especially favorable to family formation by gay and lesbian
35. For a discussion of different state approaches to the relevance of sexual orientation in
child custody disputes, See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 5, at 141-50. As Cahn and Carbone
observe, most states require a showing of at least potential harm to the child before they will
take sexual orientation into account in determining custody. Id.
36. A number of states either prohibit adoption by same-sex couples, see, e.g., MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2011), or effectively do so by prohibiting adoption by unmarried cohabitants
while refusing to recognize same-sex marriages, see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-117(3), 30-1-
2(5) (LexisNexis 2011).
37. See Joslin, supra note 23, at 691-93 (noting that only about half the states permit
second-parent adoptions).
38. Courtney G. Joslin, Interstate Recognition of Parentage in a Time of Disharmony: Same-
Sex Parent Families and Beyond, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 563, 587-89 (2009) (noting the acceptance by
courts and scholars that adoption judgments require full faith and credit, and contending that
other judicial determinations of parentage are entitled to full faith and credit as well).
39. Some couples might instead resort to forum-shopping, for instance, in the surrogacy
context, by contracting with a surrogate who lives in a state favorable to surrogacy or by
arranging for the surrogate to give birth in such a state. See generally Susan Frelich Appleton,
Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of Laws, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 399 (examining the legal
implications where a couple from a surrogacy-restrictive state seeks to make a surrogacy
arrangement in a surrogacy-permissive state).
18 [Vol. 65: 11
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parents. California law, while still unsettled, seems particularly
supportive of gay male parents who wish to bear children through the
use of a gestational surrogate, that is, a surrogate who has no genetic
tie to the child. 40 California is one of only a handful of states to
consider gestational surrogacy agreements in determining legal
parentage.4 1 While California does not enforce such agreements, it
does look to them as evidence of intent to parent, which can determine
parentage in cases where the parentage statutes do not produce a
clear result.4 2 Unlike many of the states that regulate gestational
surrogacy through a statutory scheme, California does not explicitly
require that the intended parent or parents be married-read,
heterosexual 43-or that there be a genetic tie to the child.44
California custody law coincides with California's support of
surrogacy and ART by tending to recognize the parental rights and
obligations of same-sex partners. Thus, California case law gives
parental recognition to same-sex partners who create children through
ova sharing.45 It will also recognize as a parent a same-sex partner
who functions as a parent even in the absence of any formalized or
genetic tie to the child.4 6 California law further facilitates same-sex
40. California's intermediate courts have refused to enforce a traditional surrogacy
agreement, that is, one where the surrogate mother has a genetic tie to the child. In re Marriage
of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218, 1222 (1994).
41. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 777-78, 782 (Cal. 1993) (considering gestational
surrogacy agreement as evidence of parties' intent, and using that intent to break a tie between
multiple parties with a statutory claim to parental status). In Johnson, the court found that the
agreement did not violate public policy and therefore could be considered as evidence of intent to
parent. Id. at 783-85.
42. See id. at 782-83; see also In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1422
(1998) ("There is a difference between a court's enforcing a surrogacy agreement and making a
legal determination based on the intent expressed in a surrogacy agreement.").
43. Several states with statutory schemes permitting gestational surrogacy require that the
intended parents be married, while denying marriage to same-sex couples. See, e.g., TEX. CONST.
art. 1, § 32 (limiting marriage to a man and a woman); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(b) (West
2011) (providing that, for recognition of a gestational surrogacy agreement, "[t]he intended
parents must be married to each other"). Other surrogacy statutes are by their terms limited to
married heterosexual couples. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2012) (defining the "intended
parents" in a surrogacy agreement as "a man and a woman, married to each other" who enter
into such an agreement).
44. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1412 (recognizing legal status of
intended parents where an embryo created from a donated egg and donated sperm was carried
by a gestational surrogate). While the Buzzanca court stated in a footnote that it was not
addressing the parental rights of unmarried couples, id. at 1419 n.11, some trial courts in
California have issued judgments declaring gay male couples the legal parents of children born
through surrogacy. See COURTNEY JOSLIN & SHANNON MINTER, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 4:18 (2011) (noting reports of such judgments).
45. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005).
46. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005).
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parentage by providing for registered domestic partnerships, 4 7 which,
under California's parentage statutes, give same-sex partners the
same parental status as parents in heterosexual marriages.48
California has also created an environment favorable to the
development of private businesses providing surrogacy and ART
services. Whereas some states either prohibit surrogacy altogether or
prohibit compensated surrogacy arrangements, California's highest
court held that a compensated surrogacy agreement does not violate
public policy.4 9 California's legal regime thus creates the potential for
a surrogacy-services market and for an ART market more generally.
Indeed, California is home to one of the largest sperm banks in the
country,50 as well as to a large number of fertility centers that
advertise themselves as catering to gay men and lesbians. 51 California
has further facilitated ART by holding that medical providers may not
employ a religious exemption to refuse fertility treatment on the basis
of sexual orientation.52
California's favorable setting for the creation and recognition of
gay and lesbian families is especially likely to influence interstate
migration patterns given the backdrop of less friendly legal regimes in
other states. As Professor Courtney Joslin notes, there is currently a
"wide and expanding gulf' in the various states' legal treatment of gay
and lesbian parents. 53 In many parts of the country, the legal rights of
gay and lesbian parents who create families through ART are
uncertain at best. Many states extend rights to the nonbirth parent of
a child born of ART only in the case of married parents, and at the
47. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6 (Deering 2011).
48. Id. § 297.5(d) ("The rights and obligations of registered domestic partners with respect
to a child of either of them shall be the same as those of spouses."). This statute would, for
instance, provide parental status to the partner of a woman who undergoes artificial
insemination, giving her the same rights as a husband under California Family Code § 7613(A)
(deeming a husband the legal father of any child born to his wife through artificial insemination
with his consent).
49. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783-85 (Cal. 1993).
50. See Gina Kolata, In Search of Sperm Bank's Mr. Perfect, INTL HERALD TRIB., Feb. 18,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/health/18iht-sperm.4637446.html
(describing California Cryobank).
51. See, e.g., Information for Lesbians, Gay, and Same Sex Couples, CAL. IVF: DAVIS
FERTILITY CTR., INC., http://www.californiaivf.com/lesbian-gay-same-sex-couples.htm (last
visited Feb. 14, 2012) ("[We] will work with gay men who desire to have a baby. We have also
worked with lesbian couples that have traveled here from other states due to more restrictive
treatment policies."); PAC. REPROD. SERVS., https://www.pacrepro.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2012)
(marketing facility as a "lesbian-owned sperm bank").
52. N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 959, 962 (Cal. 2008).
53. Joslin, supra note 38, at 565.
20 [Vol. 6 5: 11
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same time refuse to recognize marriages between same-sex couples. 54
Some states either refuse to recognize surrogacy agreements55 or
prohibit compensated surrogacyj 6 thus leaving gay male parents and
their children much more legally vulnerable. Others have refused to
recognize the rights and obligations of an intended parent where a
lesbian couple creates a child through artificial insemination.57
Gay and lesbian parents, then, may be drawn to jurisdictions
such as California that are most likely to recognize their parental
status. Just as nineteenth-century family law encouraged the
migration westward of white women and thus the development of a
white population in the Western Territories, twenty-first-century
family law may encourage migration to the coastal states by gay and
lesbian parents who desire legal recognition. Moreover, where gay and
lesbian parents remain in jurisdictions that fail to recognize their
status, they are deprived of the legal certainty necessary for the
flourishing of children and families. Here, too, an analogy to Abrams's
story is instructive. Abrams suggests how nineteenth-century
antimiscegenation laws harmed the stability and financial well-being
of interracial families that formed despite discouragement from the
local legal environment.58 In the same vein, the current divide in
family law tends to undermine households formed by gay and lesbian
parents. Faced with the possibility that their families will not be
recognized when the parents dissolve their relationship with each
other, when they wish to travel to another jurisdiction, or when one
parent dies, gay and lesbian parents and their children alike become
psychologically and financially vulnerable.
III. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW AND THE INTERSTATE MIGRATION OF
SAME-SEX COUPLES
In Abrams's account, states and the federal government both
extended entitlements that worked alongside family law to promote
the expansion of a white population in the American West. These
included federal homestead acts that granted land in the territories
54. See Joslin, supra note 34, at 34-36 (surveying state laws on ART).
55. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 122 (Consol. 2011) (providing that surrogacy contracts
are void and unenforceable).
56. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 722.859 (2011) (criminalizing the participation in and
facilitation of compensated surrogacy arrangements).
57. See Joslin, supra note 34, at 35 (citing Utah as an example).
58. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 1412 ("[I]n later years when the offspring of Indian-white
marriages tried to gain a share of their white fathers' estates, these laws were frequently used to
invalidate longstanding marriages.").
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first to marriageable white women and then to married white
couples,5 9 and state laws designed to encourage white women to
migrate west by granting them the right to vote and to serve on
juries.60
As in the nineteenth century, today family law shapes
population development by working in tandem with other areas of
law. A prominent contemporary instance is the law of employment
benefits. State variation in the extension of employment benefits to
same-sex spouses and same-sex domestic partners provides a further
mechanism for influencing interstate migration by gays and lesbians.
States and other localities have only a limited ability to directly
regulate the provision of benefits by private employers. Private
employers are free to provide health insurance and other benefits to
same-sex spouses or domestic partners-although, under DOMA,
those benefits are not entitled to the same federal privileges, such as
tax-exempt status, as those that stem from opposite-sex marriages.61
Any state attempt to mandate such coverage, however, runs the risk of
being preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA"). 62 ERISA's preemption rules generally supersede state
laws that "relate to" any employee plan governed by ERISA, including
health benefit plans.63 As a result, states are limited in their ability to
require private employers to provide same-sex partners or spouses
with the same benefits that opposite-sex spouses receive.
A few jurisdictions have sought to work around ERISA
preemption by developing mechanisms for indirectly requiring private
employers to provide same-sex partners or spouses with the same
benefits as opposite-sex spouses. San Francisco made an early attempt
to do so in 1996 and 1997 by enacting the Equal Benefits Ordinance,
which prohibited the city from entering into contracts with businesses
that failed to provide equal benefits to domestic partners and
spouses.64 The Air Transport Association of America and Federal
Express challenged the ordinance on ERISA-preemption grounds. It
59. Id. at 1403-05.
60. Id. at 1406-08.
61. See Janice Kay McClendon, A Small Step Forward in the Last Civil Rights Battle:
Extending Benefits Under Federally Regulated Employee Benefit Plans to Same-Sex Couples, 36
N.M. L. REV. 99, 111-12 (2006) (noting that health care provided by an employer to a same-sex
spouse, but not to an opposite-sex spouse, counts toward gross income for federal income tax
purposes, unless the spouse is a dependent of the employee).
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
63. See id. § 1144(a). For a discussion of ERISA preemption of state attempts to mandate
provision of equal benefits to same-sex domestic partners and spouses, see McClendon, supra
note 61, at 107-12.
64. See McClendon, supra note 61, at 108 (discussing the San Francisco ordinance).
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was invalidated insofar as it attempted to regulate benefits covered by
ERISA and offered through ERISA plans, such as health insurance
and pensions. 65 The ordinance was upheld in part, however. For
example, the ordinance was allowed with respect to benefits not
covered by ERISA, such as travel and relocation benefits. 66 Moreover,
the majority of companies conducting business with San Francisco
decided to voluntarily provide full benefits to domestic partners as the
code had originally contemplated. 67 The State of California as well as
twelve cities and counties-many of them in California-now have
similar equal-benefits ordinances. 68
Another state approach to procuring equal benefits for same-
sex partners and spouses while avoiding ERISA preemption is to
regulate the insurance industry rather than employers. ERISA's
savings clause exempts state laws regulating insurance from the
broader preemption provision.69 Thus, states retain considerable
freedom to enact insurance-focused rules. One insurance-regulation
approach to requiring benefits for same-sex domestic partners was
employed with some success by the State of California. In 2004,
California enacted a law preventing insurance companies from selling
group health care plans that did not offer registered domestic partners
the same benefits as spouses. 70 Under this law, employers that offer
health insurance but are not self-insured can purchase only plans
providing equal benefits to domestic partners.71 Similarly, in many
other states that provide or recognize either same-sex marriages or
domestic partnerships, insurance companies are required to offer
65. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1180 (N.D. Cal.
1998). New York City's ordinance requiring city contractors to provide equal benefits to same-sex
partners was similarly struck down as preempted by ERISA, as well as on other grounds. See
Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433, 440-42 (N.Y. 2006).
66. Air Transp. Ass'n ofAm., 992 F. Supp. at 1180. The current version of the ordinance is
found at S.F., CAL. ADMIN. CODE chs. 12B-12C (2011).
67. See CITY & CNTY. OF S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, SEVEN YEAR UPDATE ON THE SAN
FRANCISCO EQUAL BENEFITS ORDINANCE 2 (2004) (finding a compliance rate of nearly ninety-five
percent in 2003-2004).
68. See Equal Benefits Ordinances, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/equal-benefits-ordinances (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (listing
twelve cities and counties with equal-benefits ordinances).
69. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2006) (exempting state insurance, banking, and securities
regulations from ERISA preemption). For an early proposal to use state insurance regulation to
circumvent possible ERISA preemption of state laws on domestic-partner benefits, see Catherine
L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption of State and Local Laws on Domestic Partnership and Sexual
Orientation Discrimination in Employment, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 267, 279-80 (1998).
70. See Maria O'Brien Hylton et al., Same Sex Marriage and Its Implications for Employee
Benefits, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP'T POLY J. 499, 513 (2005) (discussing the California Insurance
Equality Act).
71. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.58 (Deering 2010); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 381.5,
10121.7 (Deering 2010).
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same-sex spouses and partners the same plans that are available to
opposite-sex spouses. 72 The drawback of this approach is that it does
not reach self-insured plans, i.e., health plans where an employer
itself assumes the financial risk of paying benefits instead of
purchasing a policy from a state-regulated insurance company.
ERISA's deemer clause expressly prohibits states from treating self-
insured plans as insurance companies for the purpose of state
insurance regulation. 73 Thus, a self-insured plan need not follow any
state insurance mandates, including those requiring equal benefits for
domestic partners.74
While limited in their ability to require private employers to
extend benefits to same-sex partners or spouses, states have extensive
power to determine whether such benefits are provided to state and
local employees. States vary significantly in this respect, with
potentially profound consequences for the interstate migration of gays
and lesbians. Whether public employers offer equal benefits to same-
sex couples is especially likely to affect interstate movement with
respect to state universities, which tend to recruit on a national
level.75
In the states that recognize same-sex marriage, state
employees in such marriages are entitled to the same employment
benefits as their opposite-sex counterparts.76 Again, these benefits
come with the important exception that they are not given equal
treatment under federal law.7 7 Nonetheless, such benefits align with
the other advantages of marriage, both material and expressive, to
render these states especially appealing destinations for gays and
lesbians.
Of the states that provide for domestic partnerships or civil
unions, those that offer the more robust version of these unions,
72. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2319-A(2) (2011) (requiring insurance policies
subject to state insurance law to offer domestic partners the same benefits as married spouses);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4063a(b) (2011) ("Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, insurers shall
provide dependent coverage to parties to a civil union that is equivalent to that provided to
married insureds.").
73. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
74. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Domestic Partnership and ERISA Preemption, 76 TUL. L. REV.
373, 400-01 n.106 (2001) (citing studies indicating that more than half of employers with five
hundred or more employees are self-insured).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 89-91.
76. See, for example, New York's recently enacted Marriage Equality Act, N.Y. DoM. REL.
LAW § 10-a(2) (Consol. 2011) ("No government treatment or legal status, effect, right, benefit,
privilege, protection or responsibility relating to marriage, whether deriving from statute,
administrative or court rule, public policy, common law or any other source of law, shall differ
based on the parties to the marriage being or having been of the same sex rather than a different
sex.").
77. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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including California,78 New Jersey,7 9 Oregon,80 and Washington,81
mandate equal treatment by government entities of married couples
and domestic partners or those in civil unions, thus requiring state
and local governments to provide equal benefits. Some states with a
weaker form of domestic partnership permit the extension of
insurance and other employment benefits to the domestic partners of
public employees without requiring full equal treatment. For instance,
Wisconsin created domestic partnerships, 82 authorized the extension
of insurance benefits to the domestic partners of state employees, 83
and permitted local governmental units to extend such benefits as
well.8 4 Similarly, Nevada, while providing for domestic partnerships,
explicitly leaves it up to each public employer to determine whether to
provide registered domestic partners with the same benefits as
spouses. 85
Most states have neither same-sex marriage nor formal
domestic partnerships and forbid recognition of same-sex marriages.
Some of these states-Montana and Alaska, for example-offer
benefits to the same-sex partners of their employees as the result of a
judicial finding that, in the absence of same-sex marriage, the denial
78. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (Deering 2011).
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-32(e) (West 2011).
80. OR. REV. STAT. § 106.340(1) (2009).
81. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.015 (LexisNexis 2011).
82. Wisconsin simultaneously created two types of domestic partnerships. The first is a
same-sex domestic partnership that affords those who register as domestic partners a limited
array of rights. WIS. STAT. §§ 770.001-.18 (2012); see also Appling v. Doyle, No. 10-CV-4434,
2011 WL 2447704 (Wis. Cir. Ct. June 20, 2011) (discussing rights that attach to same-sex
domestic partnerships). The second, available to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples, applies
only in the context of the public employee trust fund, which administers the group health
insurance provided to state employees. See WIS. STAT. § 40.02(21d) (defining domestic
partnership for purpose of administration of public employee trust fund); id. § 40.02(25) (defining
'eligible employee" for purpose of group insurance administered through public employee trust
fund).
83. See WIS. STAT. § 40.02(20) (defining "dependent" for purpose of administration of public
employee trust fund to include domestic partners, but providing that the department
administering state group health insurance plans "may promulgate rules with a different
definition of 'dependent' than the one otherwise provided in this subsection for each group
insurance plan"); id. § 40.51(2m)(a) (requiring public employees to submit an affidavit in proof of
domestic partnership as a condition of health benefits administered by the public employee trust
fund).
84. WIS. STAT. § 66.0137(5)(b) ("The state or a local governmental unit may provide for the
payment of premiums for hospital, surgical and other health and accident insurance and life
insurance for employees and officers, their spouses and dependent children, and their domestic
partners under ch. 770 and dependent children.").
85. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 122A.210(1) (2009) ("The provisions of this chapter do not require
a public or private employer in this State to provide health care benefits to or for the domestic
partner of an officer or employee.").
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of such benefits violates the state constitution.86 Others, such as
Kentucky, offer benefits to the same-sex partners of certain state
employees, such as employees at some state universities, without a
judicial mandate to do so. 8 7 The State of Arizona initially offered such
benefits voluntarily; when it attempted to rescind the benefits in 2009,
it was blocked by a federal injunction on the ground of Equal
Protection.88
One oft-articulated reason for voluntarily providing same-sex-
partner benefits to state university employees is that doing so helps to
recruit faculty in a competitive national market, especially given the
difficulty and expense of procuring health insurance outside of the
employment context.89 A related argument is that the provision of
benefits to gay and lesbian partners extends a measure of welcome
and respect to gays and lesbians considering joining a new
community.90 On the other side of the debate, some have opposed the
extension of benefits to same-sex partners in order to discourage the
migration of gays and lesbians to their state. One Kentucky legislator,
for instance, objected to the University of Louisville's decision to offer
domestic-partner benefits on the ground that it would draw "the
wrong kind of people" to Kentucky.91
86. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 793-94 (Alaska 2005) (holding
that the state constitution mandates extension of benefits to same-sex partners of public
employees in absence of same-sex marriage); Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 451-
52 (Mont. 2004) (holding that the Montana University System violates the state constitution by
withholding insurance benefits from same-sex domestic partners); see also Bedford v. N.H. Cmty.
Technical Coll. Sys., No. 04-E-229, 2006 WL 1217283, at *11 (N.H. Super. Ct. May 3, 2006)
(holding, prior to New Hampshire's decision to license same-sex marriages, that denying benefits
to the domestic partners of state employees violates state antidiscrimination laws); Tanner v. Or.
Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 448 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding, prior to Oregon's
establishment of domestic partnerships, that denial of benefits to same-sex partners of public
employers violates the privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution).
87. See Open Enrollment Plan: Domestic Partners, UNIV. OF LOUISVILLE,
http://ouisville.edu/hr/benefits/openenrollment/plan/eligibility/domesticpartners.html#eligibility
(last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (defining "domestic partner" for purpose of receiving domestic-partner
benefits at the University of Louisville).
88. Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 802-07, 815 (D. Ariz. 2010).
89. See, e.g., Patrick Marley & Georgia Pabst, Couples Line Up to Register as Domestic
Partners, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 3, 2009 (citing University of Wisconsin-Madison's
position that domestic-partner benefits would help in recruiting efforts); Sarah Vos & Ryan
Alessi, UK to Consider Domestic-Partner Benefits to Stay Competitive, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Sept. 12, 2006; see also Megan Boehnke, Is UT at Disadvantage Over Partner Benefits?,
KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Mar. 6, 2011 (discussing the University of Tennessee's difficulty in
recruiting and retaining faculty internationally and from out of state, given its inability to
provide benefits to same-sex partners).
90. See Boehnke, supra note 89 (citing the argument that an employer who offers equal
benefits "signal[s] to other fair minded Americans that it is a welcoming and inclusive
employer").
91. See Vos & Alessi, supra note 89 (quoting Kentucky State Senator Dick Roeding).
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Perhaps the most significant issue currently being contested on
the employment-benefits front is whether state provision of health
insurance and other benefits to same-sex partners is consistent with
state constitutional bans on same-sex marriage. Very few states have
considered the issue. In Kentucky, the Attorney General issued an
opinion finding that the provision of such benefits at the University of
Kentucky and the University of Louisville violated the state
constitutional ban on recognizing same-sex marriage or regcognizing a
legal status substantially similar to marriage. 92 More recently, in
Wisconsin, a court held constitutional a state law creating same-sex
domestic partnerships and permitting the extension of benefits to the
domestic partners of public employees. 93 The court found that
Wisconsin's domestic partnerships, which offer many fewer rights
than those of other states, were sufficiently different from marriage to
satisfy the state's prohibition on affording same-sex couples "a legal
status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage."94
The Michigan Supreme Court is the only state supreme court
to have considered whether the provision of same-sex domestic-
partner benefits by public employers violates the state prohibition on
recognizing same-sex marriage. In National Pride at Work, Inc. v.
Governor of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted the
state's marriage amendment to preclude public employers at the state
or local level, including the state's public universities, from providing
health insurance or other benefits to employees' same-sex domestic
partners.95 Michigan's constitutional marriage amendment provides
that "the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the
only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any
purpose."96 The National Pride at Work court held that providing
benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of public employees would
92. Attorney General Stumbo Issues Opinion to Rep. Lee, U.S. STATE NEWS, June 1, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 12012124. However, the opinion suggested the deficiency could be
corrected if the policies were redrawn to better differentiate domestic partnership from marriage.
Id.
93. Appling v. Doyle, No. 10-CV-4434, 2011 WL 2447704 (Wis. Cir. Ct. June 20, 2011). The
challenge to Wisconsin's domestic partnerships encompassed only the same-sex domestic
partnerships created by Wis. STAT. ch. 770. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text
(discussing differences between Wisconsin's same-sex domestic partnerships and domestic
partnerships for the purpose of receiving benefits administered by the public employee trust
fund).
94. Wis. CONST. art. XIII, § 13; Appling, 2011 WL 2447704. A similar challenge in Ohio to
the provision of domestic-partner benefits by Miami University was dismissed for lack of
standing. Brinkman v. Miami Univ., No. CA2006-12-313, 2007 WL 2410390, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 27, 2007).
95. Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 534-35 (Mich. 2008).
96. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.
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violate the marriage amendment by recognizing a union "similar" to
marriage between two members of the same sex. 97
National Pride at Work exemplifies how state legal attitudes
toward same-sex relationships can influence interstate migration by
creating an employment market either favorable or unfavorable to
gays and lesbians. In an amicus brief, several of Michigan's public
universities argued that prohibiting them from voluntarily offering
health insurance and other benefits to domestic partners would make
it difficult to "bring to the Universities and to the State of Michigan
the talent necessary to sustain their respective positions as flagship
institutions of higher education."98 The amicus brief further observed
that the enactment of Michigan's marriage amendment had already
led at least one university professor to depart the state.99 These
observations suggest how a fragmented federal system-one in which
some states offer employment benefits for same-sex partners (and, to
the extent possible, require private employers to do the same) while
others prohibit the extension of such rights-can encourage patterns
of migration that will exacerbate the current polarization of "red" and
"blue" states. Such polarization may draw gay and lesbian
employees-as well as those who support recognizing gay and lesbian
rights-to states that provide legal regimes most favorable to gay and
lesbian families.
IV. CONCLUSION
The story of the Mercer Girls illustrates how marriage and
property law work alongside restrictive immigration law to promote
the formation and flourishing of a type of population deemed
desirable. But Abrams's history reminds us that there is another side
97. Nat'l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 552. A number of Michigan's public employers
responded to the ruling by replacing domestic-partner benefits with benefits provided to a
broader category termed "other qualified adults," which typically consists of nonrelatives and
nontenants who have lived with an employee for more than six months. See, e.g., Benefits
Eligibility-Other Qualified Adults (OQA), UNIV. OF MICH., http://www.benefits.umich.edu/
eligibility/oqa.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). The state legislature, in turn, responded by
enacting legislation that prevents public employers from offering benefits to a cohabitant who is
neither the spouse nor the dependent of an employee, and who does not stand to inherit from the
employee under the laws of intestacy. Public Employee Domestic Partner Benefit Restriction Act
§ 3(1) (effective Dec. 22, 2011). In signing the bill into law, Governor Rick Snyder asserted that
it did not extend to university or state civil service employees, because to extend it thus would
violate the autonomy of universities and the state Civil Service Commission mandated by the
state constitution. H.B. 4770 Signing Statement (Dec. 22, 2011), available at
www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/122 111_HB_4770_SigningStatement 372045_7.pdf.
98. Brief for Regents of the University of Michigan et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff-Appellants, Nat'l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d 524 (No. 133554), 2007 WL 3168663 at *3.
99. Id. at *15.
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to family law's role in population development: populations deemed
less wanted are refused the rights and recognition that will ensure
their prosperity. This aspect of the story is perhaps the most
troubling.
The story that Abrams tells is, in large part, a story about
children. Family law shapes the nation by encouraging the birth of
children to populations deemed desirable. Populations deemed
undesirable, by contrast, are discouraged from forming families and
having children. But children will be born to disfavored parents,
nonetheless. And those children will develop in conditions that
disparage their existence by denying them the full legal protections of
family law.
While some families headed by gay men and lesbians may well
migrate to more favorable legal regimes, others will likely stay behind.
And those that do will contend with a system of family law that marks
them with the "second-class citizenship" described by the California
Supreme Court. 100 Gay men and lesbians in such jurisdictions will
continue to form families and to have children. And when they do,
they will face the possibility that their offspring will be denied the
benefits, certainty, and stability that legally recognized marriage
provides.
100. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008).
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